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THE MISSING HEGELIAN REVIVAL IN TAX JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Bret N. Bogenschneider* 
 
Abstract 
 
In this Article G.W.F. Hegel´s Philosophy of Right is applied directly to tax 
jurisprudence.  The duty to pay tax is identified as one aspect of Ethical Life 
(Sittlichkeit).  A counterintuitive aspect of Sittlichkeit is that it may entail 
freely willing the opportunity to pay tax to the State.  The Hegelian theory of 
retributive punishment upon a violation of Abstract Right is also examined in 
the context of tax crimes.  A few problems with the application of Hegelian 
theory to tax law are also examined including: (i) indeterminacy of law; (ii) 
sublation as method; (iii) the potential for immoral ethics; and (iv) taxation 
as interference with property rights (qua Libertarianism). Several policy 
recommendations are developed from the perspective of Hegelian theory 
including the idea of celebrating large tax remittances to the modern State.   
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The Hegelian revival in American legal discourse did not initially extend 
to tax jurisprudence.1  This is hardly surprising given how little Hegel had to say 
about taxation in the Philosophy of Right2 or his other works on the philosophy 
of law.3 In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel posited free will as abstract thought 
translating itself into reality. 4   The essence of free will accordingly entails 
thinking about and then proceeding to actually claim property in the external 
world.5   Any mention of ‗property‘ implies a role for taxation.6   Thus, we 
encounter a significant problem with taxation in Hegelian theory because ethical 
duties of the person arise in relation to the State, yet taxation paid to the State 
seems to cancel property rights and freedom.  Hegel ultimately identified ‗right‘ 
with the free will toward duty, where ‗duty‘ means achieving a synthesis between 
the subjective will of the person and the universal spirit embodied in the State.7  
                                                           
* Senior Lecturer, Finance Law and Ethics, University of Surrey.  
1 David Gray Carlson, The Hegelian Revival in American Legal Discourse, (1992) 46 University 
of Miami Law Review 1051 reviewing Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context by 
Steven B. Smith (Univ. of Chicago Press 1991); see also Hegelian revival symposium, (1989) 10 
Cardozo Law Review et. seq.. 
2 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (Knox, ed.) (Clarendon Press 1952). 
3 Michael H. Hoffheimer, Hegel´s First Philosophy of Law, (1995) 62 Tennessee Law Review 
823, 825-7 (translating to English Hegel‘s ‗First Philosophy of Law‘: Encyclopedia of 
Philosophical Sciences (1817)). 
4 Hegel, Philosophy of Right §4 (‗[F]reedom becomes actual only as will‘).  
5 Hegel, Philosophy of Right §33 (‗This first phrase of freedom we shall know as property. This is 
the sphere of forma and abstract right, to which belong property in the more developed form of 
contract and also the injury of right‘); §40 (‗Right is in the first place the immediate embodiment 
which freedom gives itself in an immediate way, i.e. possession, which is property — 
ownership.‘). 
6  See Daniel Attas, Fragmenting Property, (2006) 25 Law & Philosophy 147 (stating a 
‗Libertarian Challenge‘ that taxation logically diminishes the right to property). 
7  Hegel, Philosophy of Right §155 (‗Hence in this identity of the universal will with the particular 
will, right and duty coalesce, and by being in the ethical order a man has rights in so far as he has 
duties, and duties in so far as he has rights. In the sphere of abstract right, I have the right and 
another has the corresponding duty.‘). 
JOURNAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016) Volume 7, Issue 1 
 
Page | 2  
 
The duty to pay tax in support of the State may be a fundamental or perhaps 
even the quintessential aspect of Ethical Life in Hegelian terms.  So, at 
minimum, taxation represents a challenge for Hegelian theorists in balancing 
the competing elements of the actualization of freedom and duty.   
Hegel´s advocacy of freely willing one´s duty as the highest form of 
Ethical Life (tr. Sittlichkeit) suggests that paying one´s taxes must be an 
important aspect of duty.8  Hegel wrote, for example: ‗The right of the state is, 
therefore, higher than that of the other stages. 9   It is freedom in its most 
concrete embodiment, which yields to nothing but the highest absolute truth of 
the world-spirit.‘10  Peter Stillman thus described Hegel´s likely view of taxation 
as follows:   
 
Hegel asserts and assumes the state‘s right and power to tax.  He does not 
condition such a power on any particular requisite, such as representation, 
nor does he see taxes as a gift by citizens to state or as a quid pro quo (for 
example, for protection from others).  Ultimately, I think, taxes are for Hegel 
legitimate claims made by the state for its own purposes and maintenances.11  
 
The counterintuitive aspect of Sittlichkeit is accordingly that it may entail freely 
willing the opportunity to pay tax to the State.  Yet, if personhood is achieved 
out of the abstract in part via the ownership of property then taxation seems 
opposed to the development of this free will in the disposition of money, if not 
property.  And, if taxation diminishes property, then taxation looks like a 
diminishment of abstract freedom.  Such a limitation on freedom is potentially 
a problem if a person needs to acquire property to develop personhood in the 
first place.  As Carlson said: ‗In Hegel‘s account personality is not pre-legal.‘12  
So, at the outset, we might add to Stillman‘s description of Hegel´s likely views 
on taxation that any tax system must not be designed to be so onerous to any 
persons so as to be a de facto limitation on free will.  This idea will be developed 
in more detail below with reference to high rates of wage withholding and 
regressive tax systems. 
  
                                                           
8 Hoffheimer, 857 (‗No idea is more central to Hegel‘s philosophy of law than Sittlichkeit, or 
order based custom – the idea of a personal and social order rooted in custom as opposed to 
coercive law.‘). 
9 The stages of Hegelian development are in order of progression: Abstract Right, Moralität, 
Sittlichkeit (tr. Ethical Life).  
10 Hegel, Philosophy of Right §33. 
11 Peter Stillman, Hegel’s Analysis of Property in the Philosophy of Right, (1989) 10 Cardozo 
Law Review 1031, 1062. 
12 David Gray Carlson, How to do Things with Hegel, (2000) 78 Texas Law Review 1377, 1377; 
see also Gary Minda, (1989) 10 Cardozo Law Review 1855, 1867 reviewing The Just Economy by 
Richard Dien Winfield (‗[T]he problem with the economic theory of individual behavior is that it 
assumes there is an objective prior self to which would be assigned preferences and attitudes, 
measured and evaluated a priori.‘).   
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One general problem with the Hegelian theory of positive law particularly 
relevant to tax law and jurisprudence, was identified by Hegel in the Philosophy 
of Right (§213, et. seq.), and involves the indeterminacy of positive law when 
applied to specific facts.  Hegel wrote:  
 
Right becomes determinate in the first place when it has the form of being 
posited as positive law; it also becomes determinate in content by being 
applied both to the material of civil society… The purely positive side of law 
lies chiefly in this focusing of the universal not merely on a particular 
instance… It is true that the law does not settle these ultimate decisions 
required by actual life; it leaves them instead to the judge ‘s discretion, merely 
limiting him by a maximum and minimum.13 
 
Hegel´s reference to the indeterminacy of positive law was given in the 
year 1821 (with the first publication of the Philosophy of Right) and thus 
pre-dates the split between Continental systems of positive law and American 
ideas of legal realism by approximately a half-century.  To this day, there are 
effectively two parallel legal methods in international tax law.14  For example, 
some tax scholars take the revenue code as accessory to the larger system of 
law.15  This yields the potential for ‗null‘ results in positive law interpretation 
(e.g., double taxation, or double non-taxation) meaning the framework of the tax 
law is highly proscribed and tax avoidance may allow transactions to fall outside 
the coverage of the positive law.16  However, at least in the United States, the tax 
code expressly contemplates a substantive meaning or intent thus sharply 
limiting the potential for ‗null‘ results in tax code interpretation. 17   Hegel 
likewise seems to reject the idea of a ‗null‘ result where he says that law only 
becomes determinate in the application of the positive law to the material of civil 
society.  In Hegelian terms, the positive law is entirely abstract in the first place 
(i.e., subjectively determinate), and then only becomes objectively determinate 
                                                           
13 Hegel, Philosophy of Right at §§34, 213-4. 
14 Compare e.g. Michael Lang, The Principle of Territoriality and Its Implementation in the 
Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
(2012) 13 Florida Tax Review 305 (applying a formalist legal methodology to international tax 
law) with Romero Tavares & Marta Pankiv, The Intersection of EU State Aid Cases & U.S. Tax 
Deferrals, (2016) 17 Florida Tax Review 121 (applying a realist legal methodology to 
international tax law). 
15 See e.g. J. Scott Wilkie & Peter Hogg, Tax Law within the Larger Legal System, (2015) 52:2 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 460. 
16 See e.g. Judith Herdin & Michael Schilcher, Avoidance of Double Non-Taxation in Austria, 
15-6, in ‗Avoidance of Double Non-Taxation‘ (Lang, ed.) (2003) (‗As mentioned above the tax 
authorities believe the object and purpose of tax treaties is to avoid double taxation and double 
non-taxation in general.  This is in accordance with the Commentaries on Art. 23 of the OECD 
Model Convention which state that the basic function of Art. 23 would be to eliminate double 
taxation.  This view cannot be shared fully.  The tax treaties restrict the taxing rights of the 
contracting states in the areas they are regulating.  A further purpose cannot be deduced…If the 
contracting states want to exclude non-taxation, they have to insert subject-to-tax clauses.  If 
they do not stipulate this clause, there is no legal basis to assume that the states wanted to 
prevent double non-taxation.‘). 
17  Internal Revenue Code §7701(o) ‗Codified Economic Substance Doctrine‘; see also Bret N. 
Bogenschneider & Ruth Heilmeier, Google´s ‘Alphabet Soup’ in Delaware, (2016) 16 Houston 
Journal of Business Law & Taxation 1. 
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in its application to specific cases where the universal is revealed.18   
Since much of tax law is indeterminate in application it is not clear how 
Sittlichkeit could be achieved by application of an indeterminate positive tax law.  
Simply put, tax duty is thus not fully known to the subject.  Hegel gave a 
somewhat prescient statement of legal method at least in the context of tax law 
as follows:  ‗It is misunderstanding which has given rise alike to the demand – a 
morbid craving of German scholars chiefly – that a legal code should be 
something absolutely complete, incapable of any fresh determination in detail‘.19  
The object of the person might be seen as merely a will toward a form of positive 
law adjudication by the State whatever that might entail.  And, this does not 
appear to be a valid object for will because it is undefined (or abstract) and so 
there is accordingly no union between the individual object-ive and the universal 
(spirit).20 Put differently, the transition to a more concrete and less abstract 
stage (i.e., Abstract Right → Moralität → Sittlichkeit) in the Hegelian dialectic 
seems to fizzle where law itself is found to be indeterminate.   
Hegel accordingly foreshadowed both the indeterminacy of law and also 
the potential for factual indeterminacy in law (i.e., the origin of facts) to be 
applied in the legal system. The issue of the origin of facts in legal theory was 
developed by Michael Potács in the context of public international law with the 
argument that fact words derive content from everyday language.21  However, 
everyday language is generally not used to the same degree in tax law.  The 
content of ‗fact‘ words may thus be determinable in part by legal theory.  Hegel 
rejected the position that would later be developed by Hans Kelsen that legal 
interpretation arises solely from the positive law and not from outside law.22 
Harry Brod summarizing David Kennedy argued that  ‗Hegel… made the law 
dependent on and derivative of these first principles which must then be 
grounded elsewhere, either in morality, or history, or some other sphere… one 
thereby made the legal order subservient to other realms.‘23  That is, Hegel did 
not take the system of positive law as internally complete in the determination of 
facts that would be subject to legal interpretation.  Hegel further wrote: ‗No 
grounds can be adduced for supposing that the judge, i.e. the legal expert, should 
be the only person to establish how the facts lie, for ability to do so depends on 
general, not on purely legal, education.‘24 Of course, this citation amounts to a 
                                                           
18 Michael Quante, Personal Autonomy and the Structure of the Will in ‗Right, Morality, Ethical 
Life: Studies in G.W.F. Hegel´s Philosophy of Right‘ (Kotkavirta, ed.) (Sophi, 1997), 60 (‗[A]s 
Hegel has shown (§§ 5-16)… the subjective will of an individual is active and moves itself to 
objectivity, that is, to realize the content of the will.‘). 
19 Hegel, Philosophy of Right at §216.  
20 The word ‗spirit‘ is often used with regard to the Philosophy of Right.  As explained by 
Quante, ‗spirit‘ refers to the universal objective will manifested in the state which is part of 
Sittlichkeit:  ‗In regard to the individual the social world is something external, but in regard to 
Spirit it is internal.  [P]ersonal autonomy… requires a natural basis and suitable social world.‘ 
Quante, 57; Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 401 (‗Spirit which in this manner is the idea of reason 
subsisting in and for itself and which is for itself as such, is the concept of absolute spirit. ‘).   
21 See Michael Potács, Legal Theory (Kluwer, 2015). 
22 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (Knight tr.) (University of California Press, 2nd ed. 
1967); Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, (1941) 55 Harvard 
Law Review 44. 
23  Harry Brod, Book Review: International Legal Structures, by David Kennedy, (1989) 10 
Cardozo Law Review 1879, 1884. 
24 Hegel, Philosophy of Right at §227. 
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non-Kelsenian thesis since the origin of legal norms would arise at least in part 
from the prior stage of Moralität, as example, rather than positive law.   
In Hegelian terms, ethics means translating morality (the subjective idea 
of right) into the world thereby rending morality determinate.25  Duty means 
willing toward the universal spirit, where that ‗spirit‘ arises in the stage of Ethical 
Life (Sittlichkeit).26  The manifestation of the universal spirit is ‗state‘ which is 
the final stage of Ethical Life.27  A further issue in the application of Hegelian 
theory to taxation is that the duty to pay tax to the State seems to be a function of 
Sittlichkeit and not Abstract Right.  In formal terms, the failure of a duty to pay 
tax is a civil (or fraudulent) form of wrong behavior and such failure of duty by a 
person does not involve the formal interference with the Abstract Right of any 
other person apart from the State.  Hegel identified this problem and proposed 
that duties arising in State may also be a function of Abstract Right.  However, 
most crimes against property violate aspects of both Sittlichkeit and Abstract 
Right, not just Sittlichkeit.  Critically, if the duty to pay tax is not an aspect of 
Abstract Right, Hegel´s advocacy of retributive punishment is presumably not 
applicable to tax crimes.  Of course, an indirect interference with Abstract Right 
can be imagined by anticipating the consequences of the failure to pay tax.  
However, consequentialism is not the proper consideration as a matter of 
Hegelian formalism.   
In the modern era, taxing authorities have attempted to get around the 
dilemma that taxation is foremost a civil duty by requiring attestation as to the 
accuracy of the information presented on the tax return.  But, if the taxing 
authority refuses to accept an unsigned return by rule under penalty of law, this 
converts a civil duty to a matter of Abstract Right (crime against another 
person), thus rendering the taxpayer subject to retributive punishment for an 
ostensibly lesser civil or fraud violation.  And, the approach of shoe-horning 
Abstract Right via the administration of tax law seems to limit the free will (or 
voluntary) compliance with the objective statement of tax law.  Stillman argued 
along these lines that the payment of tax in money (rather than property) 
provides an opportunity for the exercise of free will by the taxpayer.28  But, as 
Ossi Martikainen explained: ‗The main point of Hegel‘s theory is that right 
(Recht) is the existence (Dasein) of free will. The system of right realizes free 
                                                           
25 Hegel, Philosophy of Right §140 (‗That determinate content which I, as subject, give to the 
good, however, is the good known to me in the action, i.e. it is my good intention (see § 114). ‘); 
see also Hegel, Philosophy of Right §155 (‗In the moral sphere, the right of my private judgement 
and will, as well as of my happiness, has not, but only ought to have, coalesced with duties and 
become objective.‘).   
26 Hegel, Philosophy of Right §138 (‗The moral point of view, however, is defective because it is 
purely abstract. When I am aware of my freedom as the substance of my being, I am inactive and 
do nothing. But if I proceed to act and look for principles on which to act, I grope for something 
determinate and then demand its deduction from the concept of the free will.‘). 
27  Hegel, Philosophy of Right §133 (‗[T]he essence of the will is duty. Now if my knowledge stops 
at the fact that the good is my duty, I am still going no further than the abstract character of duty. 
I should do my duty for duty‘s sake, and when I do my duty it is in a true sense my own 
objectivity which I am bringing to realisation. In doing my duty, I am by myself and free. ‘). 
28 Stillman, 1062 (‗Monetary taxes are also consistent with free choice - the arbitrary will of 
abstract right... When the state exacts monetary taxes, then the individual can choose how to 
earn the money to pay the tax, so that his taxpaying is ―mediated through his own arbitrary will‖ 
and his ―subjective freedom‖ is resected.‘‘). 
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will, and nothing that fails to express the existence of free will can claim to be a 
right.‘ 29  The forced attestation on the tax return thus amounts to an 
abridgement of Hegelian free will and therefore cannot be right. 
The dialectical development toward Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit) may also 
illustrate an underlying problem with the ‗sublation‘ method itself.  The 
Hegelian sublation method was described by Thomas Knox as: ‗The later stages 
cancel the earlier ones, and yet at the same time the earlier ones are absorbed 
within the later as moments within them.‘30  As an illustration of a problem 
arising sublation: What if Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit) becomes immoral in the 
world?  In the tax context, we can easily imagine a situation (with significant 
modern-day and historical precedent) of regressive systems of taxation.31  A 
further question then arises of whether Sittlichkeit requires de facto 
collaboration with a potentially immoral (i.e., non-universalizable system) of tax 
law; hence, in actual practice ethical behavior with regard to taxation may 
become potentially immoral behavior, and vice versa.  As every tax lawyer 
knows from experience, the State does not necessarily act according to the 
universalized will of the people since the object of the taxing authority acting on 
behalf of the State could be something entirely different from the will of the 
democracy.  Public choice theory in the field of economics has developed a 
series of explanations for why and how the will of the State itself may deviate 
from the Hegelian objective spirit.   
The Article begins first with a description of the Hegelian framework in 
the context of tax law.  The Hegelian idea of retributive punishment is then 
explored in the context of tax crimes.  Next, several of the apparent problems in 
application of Hegelian theory to tax law are explored.  In the final section, the 
practical implications of a Hegelian revival in tax jurisprudence are discussed.  
One major difference from prior conceptions of tax jurisprudence results from 
the Hegelian rejection of the ‗state of nature‘ as the origin of the social contract.  
This approach results in a very different tax jurisprudence in comparison to 
Richard Epstein´s Taxation in the Lockean World, for example, or other 
contemporary descriptions of tax jurisprudence.32 
  
                                                           
29 Ossi Martikainen, The Principle of the Subjectivity and Sittlichkeit in Hegel´s Philosophy of 
Right, 105, 111. 
30 Thomas M. Knox, Philosophy of Right, Translation Preface, X.  
31 See Bret Bogenschneider, Income Inequality & Regressive Taxation in the United States, 
(2015) 4:3 Interdisciplinary Journal of Economics & Business Law 8. 
32 Richard A. Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, (1986) 4:1 Social Philosophy & Policy 49. 
JOURNAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016) Volume 7, Issue 1 
 
Page | 7  
 
HEGEL´S PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO TAX LAW 
 
Hegelian theory is given via the dialectic in progressive stages, namely: 
Abstract Right, Morality (tr. Moralität) & Ethical Life (tr. Sittlichkeit).33  This 
position means the stage of Ethical Life is then broken down into additional 
stages: Family, Civil Society and State. 34   For tax scholars familiar with 
Hobbesian or Lockean theory the stage of Abstract Right is akin to the ‗state of 
nature‘ but with critical differences.35  In Hegelian theory the person does not 
enter into society as a fully formed individual ready to enter into contracts with 
other persons.  As Michel Rosenfeld explained: ‗Hegel calls his counterpart to 
the Hobbesian individual in the state of nature the ‗abstract person,‘ indicating 
that this person is a construct who has been cut off from many of the diverse 
concrete determinations of the real historical person.‘ 36   As a matter of 
jurisprudence, Hegel expressly rejected the ‗social contract‘ as the origin of civil 
society.37  Hegel wrote: 
 
[Natural law] constructed a state of nature in which natural law was supposed 
to be valid. In contrast, the state of society and of the political state required 
rather a restriction of freedom and a sacrifice of natural rights. But in fact law 
and all its determinations are grounded solely in free personality, in a 
self-determination which is in fact just the opposite of 
natural-determination.38 
 
As such, as a matter of Hegelian philosophy, the person (here the taxpayer) is 
determined within and by society, and not apart from it as in Libertarian moral 
theory of the relation between the State and the taxpayer.  And, by moving from 
the sphere of Civil Society to State the person is empowered to gain additional 
freedoms.39 
  
                                                           
33 Chad McCracken, Hegel and the Autonomy of Contract Law, (1999) 77 Texas Law Review 
719, 743 (‗The spheres of right, from lowest (i.e., most abstract) to highest (i.e., most concrete), 
are as follows: Abstract Right, Morality, Ethical Life.  Ethical Life is itself divided into three 
subspheres: family, civil society, and state.‘).   
34 Ibid (‗The transition from each sphere of right to a higher sphere is a dialectical one, brought 
about by contradictions which cannot be resolved in the lower sphere.‘). 
35 See Arthur Jacobson, Hegel’s Legal Plenum, (1989) 10 Cardozo Law Review 877, 878. 
36 Michel Rosenfeld, Hegel and the Dialectics of Contract, (1989) 10 Cardozo Law Review 1199, 
1209.  
37  Ibid, 1255 (‗[T]he state, representing the perspective of the community as a whole, cannot be 
the product of a contract, according to Hegel, because the perspective of society as a whole is that 
of the universal will as opposed to the arbitrary will.‘).   
38 G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s First Philosophy of Law: Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences  (1817) 
(Hoffheimer, tr.), §415. 
39 Raj Bhala, Hegelian Reflections on Unilateral Action in the World Trading System, (1997) 15 
Berkeley Journal of International Law 159, 221. 
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Abstract Right, Morality (Moralität) and Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit) 
 
The stage of Abstract Right is Hegel´s formal description of the subjective will 
staking a claim in the objective world.40  The abstract will must develop what 
amounts to personhood and thereby become less abstract by acquiring property 
of things in the world which renders attributes and personality.41   Stillman 
wrote: ‗[Hegel] sees the right to property in things as the basis for the rights of 
the person to life and liberty.  The person claims himself as he claims a property 
– through his will to own, occupy, and modify and transform himself.‘42  This is 
achieved by acquiring things recognized by other persons as the property of the 
subject; ‗For Hegel, property is essential for an individual‘s freedom.  In the 
immanent logical development of the free will, a person‘s will, hitherto internal 
and merely subjective, becomes in property ‗an actual will‘ for the first time 
because it gains its ‗first embodiment‘ in the external world.‘43  Accordingly, it is 
through such acquisition of property the person becomes a legal subject. The 
subject also becomes aware of its identity as a person.44 As Jeanne Schroeder 
elaborates: 
 
[T]o Hegel, the abstract person in the ‗state of nature‘ is not yet a ‗subject‘ in 
the jurisprudential sense of a being capable of bearing legal rights and being 
bound by legal duties.  The abstract person can only achieve this capacity 
(subjectivity) through relationships with other legal actors (subjects) who 
recognize him as one of their own (hence the term ‗intersubjectivity‘).45   
 
In Hegelian terms, becoming a legal person means being recognized by others as 
a person capable of owning property.  The object of the ownership of property is 
solely to impress others.  In Hegel‘s words:: ‗The recognition is recognition not 
only of the abstract personality of others but is rather recognition of their real 
personality; i.e., it is recognition of their [own] judgment.‘46 Carlson clarified 
further: ‗It is now possible to see why the self craves recognition.  The self 
cannot perceive its own properties.  It needs the other to bestow that property 
on the self.  Yet without properties, the self is nothing.  In its most abstract 
form, property is pure being-for-other.‘47 
The next stage after Abstract Right is Moralität, which has been severely 
                                                           
40  Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of 
Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, (1989) 10 Cardozo Law Review 1077, 
1170  (‗When the free will is conceived as abstractly universal and no more, the system of right 
that is based thereon is also formal and is called ―abstract‖ right...‘). 
41 Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal Property Rights, 
(1996) 81 Iowa Law Review 1331, 1367  (‗Hegel thus justified a social conception of legal 
personality in the mutual recognition of wills in property and contract.‘). 
42 Stillman, 1040. 
43 Ibid, 1062. 
44  Hegel, Philosophy of Right §35 (‗―Person‖ is essentially different from ―subject‖, since 
―subject‖ is only the possibility of personality; every living thing of any sort is a subject. A person, 
then, is a subject aware of this subjectivity, since in personality it is of myself alone that I am 
aware. A person is a unit of freedom aware of its sheer independence.‘). 
45 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Never Jam To-Day: On the Impossibility of Takings Jurisprudence, 
(1996) 84 Georgetown Law Journal 1531, 1534. 
46 Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences,§411. 
47  Carlson, ‗How to do Things with Hegel‘, 1392. 
JOURNAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016) Volume 7, Issue 1 
 
Page | 9  
 
criticized by contemporary scholars as severable from the rest of Hegelian 
theory.48  Hegel described the stage of Moralität in abstract Kantian terms with 
the familiar principle of universalization.49 As explained by Rosenfeld: ‗Instead, 
this duty is a universal moral duty, which in its initial appearances is an 
expression of Moralität – that is, a Kantian duty-based morality that prescribes 
that all actions should conform to universal maxims.‘50 However, the concept of 
morality is abstract in that the substantive content to test the universalization 
can only be known with reference to the later dialectical stage of Ethical Life.  
Modern scholars thus interpret the stage of Moralität as bridging individual 
morality with the community of which the individual is a part: ‗Joachim Ritter‘s 
well-known interpretation lays emphasis on the fact that while Kant connects 
morality to the individual and the inner life (lnnerlichkeit), Hegel with his idea of 
Sittlichkeit strives to bring together the conflict between individual and 
community.‘ 51  The difficulty with taxation is that it represents perhaps the 
quintessential example of conflict between the individual and the State.  It is 
hard to define morality as simply the will of the State whatever that may entail; 
nonetheless, Hegel described it as a ‗blunder‘ to compare private interest against 
the interests of the State.52  Nonetheless, from Moralität, the Hegelian dialectic 
proceeds to the stage of Sittlichkeit, which is the origin of morality rendered 
determinate. As Martikainen explained:  
 
First the individual will has to give it-self an external existence. This happens 
in the form of property and those relations of right which belong to it, 
discussed in the section entitled Abstract Right. [The will´s]… own inner 
reflection about the justifiability of its external actions, discussed in the 
chapter on morality. Finally, free will is the objective reality of the laws and 
institutions of Sittlichkeit.53 
  
                                                           
48 Tuija Pulkkinen, Morality in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in ‗Right, Morality, Ethical Life: 
Studies in G.W.F. Hegel´s Philosophy of Right‘ (Kotkavirta, ed.) (Sophi, 1997) 30 (‗It is often 
stated that in Hegel‘s text the individual moral agent vanishes and that the theme of the section 
―Morality‖ is completely lost in the concept of ―Sittlichkeit‖. The accusation is that Hegel‘s ethics 
is nothing but a reinforcement of the existing social norm structure and that Hegel‘s social 
philosophy is actually sociology without any moral content.‘) citing W.H. Walsh, Hegelian Ethics 
(MacMillan, 1969). 
49 Hegel, Philosophy of Right §135 (‗The proposition: Act as if the maxim of thine action could be 
laiddown as a universal principle‖, would be admirable if we already had determinate principles 
of conduct.‘). 
50 Rosenfeld, 1213. 
51  Pulkkinen, 30 citing Joachim Ritter, Moralität and Sittlichkeit. Zu Hegel´s 
Auseinender-setzung mit der kantischen Ethik. Materialen zu 217-243. 
52 Hegel, Philosophy of Right §126 (‗[I]t is one of the commonest blunders of abstract thinking to 
make private rights and private welfare count as absolute in opposition to the universality of the 
state.‘). 
53 Ibid, 112. 
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Ethical Life: Family, Civil Society and State 
 
Ethical Life is the final stage in the development of free will; ‗The identity 
of the good with the subjective will, an identity which therefore is concrete and 
the truth of them both, is Ethical Life.‘54 This means that the subjective person 
has internalized the universal spirit and made it her own ethos.  The universal 
spirit is embodied in the laws of society.55  In the words of Salter wrote: ‗[T]he 
results of this universalizing reflection are enshrined and realized in a concrete 
manner within objective social institutions, rules, values and laws.‘56  However, 
it is also necessary that the universal spirit encompass reason or rationality.  
Hegel averred that: ‗When I will the rational, I do not act as a particular 
individual but according to the conception of ethical life in general. In an ethical 
act I establish not myself but the thing. A man, who acts perversely, exhibits 
particularity.‘57   Hence, universal spirit means not only the laws of society 
(which may be internalized by the subjective will), but a further requirement that 
the laws be reasoned and knowable.58  With respect to the stages of family, civil 
society and State, ‗civil society‘ is universal spirit in the abstract (or the idea of 
universal spirit).  ‗Family‘ reflects the basic independent economic unit and a 
sphere for private property.59 However, taken as apart from family, the ‗State‘ is 
the objective embodiment of universal spirit.  The State establishes social 
institutions which embody Ethical Life where the subject freely participates 
therein.  Quante explained:  
 
The objectivity can be seen… in the structures of social or political institutions 
and in ethical life. These systems of rights are the objective, realized freedom 
of the will – the Objective Spirit has unfolded this material content by 
developing objective structures through which the subjective will can realize 
its freedom.60   
 
So, Sittlichkeit primarily reflects the transition from subjective thinking to 
objective doing.  And, of course, objective doing requires paying taxes (i.e., not 
just thinking about paying taxes).  The recognition of duty to participate in the 
institutions of the State is the basis for objectively knowing ethical behavior 
including the duty to pay tax.   
RETRIBUTIVE PUNISHMENT OF TAX CRIMES. 
 
                                                           
54 Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 141 
55 The individual person also actualizes freedom by recognition of laws.  See Richard Hyland, 
Hegel: A User´s Manual, (1987) 10 Cardozo Law Review 1735, 1783 . 
56 Michael Salter, Justifying Private Property Rights: A Message from Hegel´s Jurisprudential 
Writings, (1987) 7 Legal Studies 245, 246. 
57  Philosophy of Right §15 
58 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §215 (‗To hang the laws so high that no citizen could read them (as 
Dionysius the Tyrant did) is injustice of one and the same kind as to bury them in row upon row 
of learned tomes, collections of dissenting judgments and opinions, records of customs, &c., and 
in a dead language too, so that knowledge of the law of the land is accessible only to those who 
have made it their professional study.‘). 
59 Ibid, 107 (‗First, the family forms the basic independent economic unit and thus a sphere for 
private property. Second, it provides its members with the sphere for immediate feeling of love 
and unity.‘). 
60 Quante, 60. 
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Hegel´s Philosophy of Right crime negates right and must be formally 
annulled.  However, the annulment of crime is not to avoid negative 
consequences by deterrence of future crime, but to defend right.61  Hegelian 
punishment is therefore retributive punishment.62  The purpose of punishment 
is also not the rehabilitation of the criminal within society, although that might 
occur if the criminal chooses to respect the right of other persons in the future as 
a result of punishment.  Hegelian punishment is also not for the purpose of 
deterrence of crime.63  Hegel famously argued against deterrence as follows: ‗To 
base a justification of punishment on threat is to like it to the act of a man who 
lifts his stick to a dog.  It is to treat a man like a dog, instead of with the freedom 
and respect due to him as a man.‘64 Hegelian theory is perhaps best understood 
as the formal defense of right in the abstract as achieved by the punishment of 
wrongdoing against the universal spirt. Matthew Pauley explainsd: ‗Crime, Hegel 
says, is the negation not only of the particular but also the universal.  That is to 
say, when a criminal steals another person‘s property, he is not only denying that 
person‘s right to own that piece of property, he is denying the right to property in 
itself.‘ 65   The punishment relates to nullification of the criminal act in the 
abstract and not the nullification of the person as criminal.66 
As explained above, the Hegelian dialectic in the Philosophy of Right 
traces the development of free will toward universal spirit.  Such dialectical 
method is also applied in the context of crime and punishment.  The abstract 
negation of crime is accordingly a function of Abstract Right.  This framework is 
directly linked to property rights and crimes against property.  Pauley 
articulates this thus: 
 
The stance that the criminal implicitly adopts, that there are no rights, must 
be rejected and annulled if rights are to have actuality and force.  For Hegel, 
punishment is precisely this annulment.  Its function is to erase, restore the 
right to own property… reestablish the possibility of freedom‘s actualization, 
and recover thereby the (at least partial) truth of the Notion of Right.67   
The criminal act is the destruction of right as expressed in laws 68 and the 
abstract idea of right (i.e., Abstract Right) is the primary consideration in 
punishment, and not, morality or ethics.  Then, in terms of the punishment of 
                                                           
61 See Peter Stillman, Hegel’s Idea of Punishment, (1976) 14:2 History of Philosophy 169, 172 
(‗To annul the crime is not optional: it is required. Otherwise, the crime – and its implicit denial 
of rights – would be held as valid.  In abstract right, if the rights of one person are allowed to be 
negated by crime, then – since persons are equal in rights – all persons lose their rights.‘).  
62 Ibid, 177 (‗The essence of crime has to do not with the specific injury or theft but with the 
coercion of rights; the retribution, then, need only be an equivalent of coercion of rights, not the 
same particular coercion.  It is not the empirical identity of an eye for an eye, it is the abstract, 
mental, universal identity of value that is important.‘). 
63 Ibid, 177-8 (‗Deterrence judges the criminal according to an entirely external standard, the 
result of his being punished on others; and, for Hegel, this is to treat the criminal as a thing, 
without rights and autonomy.  Only with a retributive system of penalties must there be justice 
and desert.‘) 
64 Matthew Pauley, The Jurisprudence of Crime and Punishment from Plato to Hegel, (1994) 39 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 97, 143. 
65, 140-1.  
66 Ibid, (‗[P]unishment, for Hegel, is the ―negation of the negation‖ that is crime.‘). 
67  Ibid citing Peter Steinberger, Hegel on Crime and Punishment, (1983) 77:4 American 
Political Science Review 860. 
68 Stillman, 180. 
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tax crimes the ultimate goal would be to annul any violation of Abstract Right 
caused by the crime, if any exists. 
 
Civil Offence, Fraud, and Crime 
 
Hegel defines wrong in relation to three categories: non-malicious wrong 
(civil offense), fraud and crime. 69   However, the differentiation of these 
categories in the context of tax crimes is not entirely clear.  For example, a civil 
offense relates in part to unintentional crimes where a person is ignorant of the 
law.  As Markus Dirk Dubber wrote: ‗When I commit an unintentional wrong I 
try to follow the law and therefore respect it, but I find out later that I violated 
it.‘70 Some civil offenses (especially tax crimes) are committed intentionally.  
Pauley differentiates on the separate grounds of ‗malicious‘ intent where the 
difference seems to be the intent to cause harm to another person.  Pauley thus 
defines the question as solely of Abstract Right.  By this definition, a civil 
offense committed intentionally is done with malice against the State, but not 
against a particular legal person.  Such malice against the State is not 
cognizable in the stage of Abstract Right without looking forwards or backwards 
to other stages in the dialectic (presumably by sublation).  On the other hand, a 
crime against another legal person (e.g., as a matter of Abstract Right) does not 
deny the right of the State except where that harm is also cognized in positive 
law.  However, the deprivation of another person´s legal rights is not always 
cognized in law.71 For example, the violation of rights without legal recourse 
actually entered the American vocabulary with the word ‗railroading‘ where 
small farmers and landholders were forced off their land by the broad exercise of 
eminent domain.72 
Fraud adds yet another inconsistency to the Hegelian framework in that 
with fraud the criminal purports to act in accordance with the law, but in actual 
fact, does not.  As a formal matter of interpretation, fraud does not violate 
Abstract Right.  Fraud violates substantive right.  Fraud violates universal 
spirit without violating positive law (other than a specific anti-fraud statute).  
This is a substantive challenge to law as opposed to the formal challenge.  This 
is illustrated in the tax context where formal tax planning can be used to meet 
the requirements of positive law as opposed to the substance of the tax law.  
Ironically, this is sometimes called violation of the ‗spirit‘ of the tax law.  In 
Hegelian terms, formal tax planning violates the Hegelian ‗universal spirit‘ 
embodied in positive law.  Such use of formalistic tax planning led to the 
adoption of the economic substance doctrine in the tax code of the United States.  
The economic substance doctrine can be understood in Hegelian terms as the 
last-ditch defense of substantive right.  Just as Hegel predicted, the economic 
substance doctrine is applied by the judge (or taxing authority) in particular 
                                                           
69 Pauley, 140.  
7 0 Markus Dirk Dubber, Rediscovering Hegel´s Theory of Crime and Punishment (1994) 92 
Michigan Law Review 1577, 1607. 
7 1 See Markus Wahlberg, Punishment as Ideal Reconciliation and Real Regeneration, 5, 18 (‗For 
a crime is not only an attack against the right in itself and against an individual´s rights, but also 
an attack against the social validity of rights.‘). 
7 2 The Dictionary of American Slang, Barbara Kipfer & Robert Chapman (eds.) (Harper Collins, 
4th ed. 2007). 
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cases only.   Hegel postulated : ‗But apart from being applied to particular 
instances, right by being embodied in positive law becomes applicable to the 
single case. Hence it enters the sphere where quantity, not the concept, is the 
principle of determination.‘73  
 
Tax Crime and Abstract Right 
 
The essence of ‗crime‘ is that the rights of another legal person are 
violated by the criminal  Many tax avoidance crimes ostensibly fall into the 
category of intentional civil violations.  Other tax violations may be 
unintentional civil crimes (particularly where the tax laws are indeterminate).  
But, this differentiation between intentional versus unintentional civil crimes is 
problematic because under Hegel´s framework, civil offenses seem to be taken 
as a lessor version of wrong since retributive punishment is taken solely as a 
matter of Abstract Right.  For example, in civil crimes, the aggrieved party is the 
State; the State arises as a sphere of Ethical Life.  Therefore, tax crimes are not 
covered as a question of Abstract Right.  The Hegelian framework does not 
apply very well in the context of taxation because we need to apply sublation to 
mix and match concepts between the stages of Abstract Right, Sittlichkeit (and 
conceivably, Moralität).  Notably, where morality is taken as the idea of 
subjective right, it is conceivable that a Libertarian could act morally in the 
violation of Abstract Right (or ethics), for example, thereby implicating all of the 
Hegelian dialectical stages at once.  
Tax fraud entails a situation where the taxpayer conceals the fact of the 
fraud from the taxing authority, presumably with a false or misleading tax 
return.  The paradoxical aspect of punishment in the Philosophy of Right is 
then that the formal compliance with the tax law (apart from an anti-fraud 
statute) mitigates in favor of the tax fraudster purporting to be in compliance 
with the tax law, but is not so. Dubber notes that even in deception one ‗ 
indirectly affirm the law by pretending even though knowingly misrepresenting 
it to the  the victim.‘74   As a matter of tax jurisprudence, if only the form of the 
tax return is publicly known, such tax fraud does not directly undermine 
taxpayer morale.  So, where the universal spirit of taxation is understood as the 
substance of taxpayer morale then universal spirit is not violated by fraud.  But, 
fraud is the clearest example of substantive non-compliance with universal 
spirit.  Such malice against the universal spirit incumbent to an intentional civil 
violation is the essence of a failure of Ethical Life. 
   
Legal Norms and Customs in the State. 
 
As a matter of legal interpretation it is the law itself which determines 
what is right.  According to Kelsen‘s ‗separation thesis‘ law is not to be regarded 
as a policy instrument as this would constitute sociology and not law.75  Hegel 
                                                           
7 3 Hegel, Philosophy of Right §214. 
7 4 Dubber, 1607. 
7 5 Jochen von Berstorff & Thomas Dunlap, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2010), 251; Margosia Fitzmaurice, Review of Recent Books on 
International Law (Bilder, ed.) (2010) 104 American Journal of International Law 329 citing 
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begins by saying something similar to Kelsen.  He noted that: ‗Laws (Gesetze) 
express the nature and determinations of the universal substance.‘76 However, 
in Hegelian terms this is merely the abstract idea of law; ‗[t]he formalism of law 
consists in the fact that it is the abstract and, consequently, the unmediated 
determination of free personality.‘77  Then, the question is how to transition the 
abstract idea into an objective actual.  This requires first enshrining the 
universal spirit in law, and then, making determinations of what law means in 
particular situations.78 In the transition to the objective from the abstract, the 
Hegelian theory of law is the formal rejection of the ‗separation thesis‘.  The 
positive law does not exist for its own sake, but to carry out the universal spirit; 
‗[t]he abstract essence of laws is the universal will existing in and for itself.  But 
the actuality of laws is living custom.‘79  The universal will is embodied in the 
customs of the people.80  Accordingly Hegel wrote:  
 
Order based on Custom is the completion of objective spirit. It is not only the 
truth of law and morality in the form of their unity, but it is rather the truth of 
subjective and objective spirit. Order based on Custom is namely freedom in 
the form of the universal rational will.81  
 
In general, the law needs to be written down so that it can be known.  This 
makes the law seem closed and complete in the abstract contemplation of 
positive law.  However, as with the Hegelian differentiation between morality 
and ethics, the transition from subjective to objective means that the law 
becomes indeterminate in the application to specific facts, just as knowing moral 
behavior becomes determinate in the application to specific cases.  Hegel 
aticulated this stance thus:   
 
For a public legal code, simple general laws are required, and yet the nature 
of the finite material to which law is applied leads to the further determining 
of general laws ad infinitum. On the one hand, the law ought to be a 
comprehensive whole, closed and complete; and yet, on the other hand, the 
need for further determinations is continual.82 
 
Thus in Hegelian terms, the interpretation of positive law is abstract ‗sociology‘ 
in determining how the law reflects the customs of society.  This is achieved 
where the law is applied to specific facts and is thereby rendered determined by 
application.  The judge is not making the social practices but determining what 
they actually are in adjudicating the case.  Accordingly, what the law is reflects 
the universal spirit of the people stated objectively whereas the positive law 
                                                                                                                                                                           
George Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiator? Your Treaty of Our Interpretation of 
It, (1971) 65 American Journal of International Law 372. 
7 6 Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, § 437 
7 7  Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, §415. 
7 8 See Chad McCracken, Hegel and the Autonomy of Contract Law, (1999) 77 Texas Law 
Review 719, 734. 
7 9 Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, § 438. 
80 Rosenfeld, 1213 (‗Inherent in the concept of Sittlichkeit is the notion of community as defined 
through the amalgam of customs and norms which have been internalized by a people and which 
have given shape to its collective identity.‘).   
81 Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, § 430. 
82 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §216. 
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represents merely the abstract idea.  Further simple general laws are required 
so as to reflect the customs of the people elevated to the status of law.  If there is 
no custom on a particular set of facts, this does not render a ‗null‘ result as 
something automatically outside the positive system of law, as the judge must 
‗continually make further determinations.‘  
 
SUBLATION AND OTHER PROBLEMS IN THE HEGELIAN 
DIALECTIC AS APPLIED TO TAXATION 
 
The tension between freedom versus duty in Hegelian philosophy, as 
perhaps best illustrated in its application to taxation, relates in part to the 
dialectical method itself.  That is, freedom is embodied in property in the stage 
of Abstract Right; the objective person then contemplates right to arrive at 
Moralität; and only then identifies duty in the stage of Ethical Life by freely 
willing toward objective spirit.  So, where Ethical Life limits freedom by some 
significant degree the sublation inherent to the dialectical method Hegelian 
philosophy both begins and ends with the concept of ‗freedom‘.   Nietzschean 
philosophy in particular seems opposed to Hegel because the Nietzschean 
overman (tr. ―Übermensch‖ meaning transcending human morality) does not 
recognize either the latter stages of Moralität or Sittlichkeit.  Hegelian duty is 
the embracing of societal rules in Ethical Life, such as the requirement to pay 
tax, whereas Nietzsche would reject the entire premise of freely willing toward 
one´s duty to pay taxes to the State as determined by others.  Likewise, 
Libertarian theory directly focuses on the individual relation to State and the 
moral limits of restrictions on individual freedom, such as taxation by the State. 
 
Taxation as a Limitation on Freedom (qua Libertarianism) 
 
The Hegelian critique of Libertarian theory might be interpreted as an 
objection to the Libertarian beginnings at the stage of Moralität without 
considering the abstract origins of the person as subject.  In tax jurisprudence 
we are concerned primarily with Hobbes and Locke. Hegel develops the person 
out of the subject in the earlier stage of Abstract Right. It is only the person that 
can become the bearer of legal rights.  Various Hegelian scholars have made 
this point in detail.  However, a Libertarian response to Hegel might be given 
along the lines that the ethical question of duty is the primary focus of the theory 
in the relation of the individual to the Leviathan.83  This issue is particularly 
acute with regard to taxation.  Hence, everything depends on the validity of 
sublation applied as part of the dialectical method.  If sublation is valid, then 
the progression from abstract, to moral, to ethical results in a proper conception 
of duty.  If sublation is not valid, then the progression fails in the stage of 
Ethical Life where the person lacks sufficiency to develop freedom at the earlier 
more abstract stage.  This failure of duty occurs even in the Hegelian method 
with the development of Abstract Right.  So, under this argument Libertarian 
theory still holds even if we grant Hegel´s point that personhood does not arrive 
out of thin air. 
                                                           
83  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-Wealth 
Ecclesiastical and Civil (Shapiro, ed.) (Yale University Press 2010). 
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A possible solution to the thematic dilemma identified above is offered by 
by Pulkkinen thus: ‗Civil Society… is action which takes the existing law and 
customs as the norm for right conduct.  The Civil Society is law-abiding society, 
while the State is the processing of changing the laws and customs.‘84 Sublation 
refers to the formal origins of right.  Hence, if Hegelian Civil Society is 
interpreted as the evolution of laws with the potential for change by will (i.e., the 
freedom of will to change) then we arrive at a more workable system.  Nietzsche 
notably reserves the right of the individual to change the laws and customs. So, if 
Hegel also allowed for change to customs and norms this might subsume 
Nietzsche as merely an agent of change toward moral customs and legal norms.  
Thus, Pulkkinen´s approach more clearly distinguishes Libertarian theory. 
However, Libertarian theory is not about an attempted change to the universal 
spirit, but more about the moral limits of open resistance to spirit. 85   In 
Hegelian terms, open resistance to spirit is unethical as it does not embody 
Ethical Life.  Yet, Libertarianism is subjectively moral.  A valid interpretation 
of Hegel is accordingly that Libertarian theory applied to tax jurisprudence is 
moral but not ethical.  
 
What if Ethical Life Becomes Immoral? 
 
The more difficult philosophical dilemmas arise not from Libertarianism 
where something thought to be subjectively moral is objectively unethical, but 
the reverse situation where the objective will is found to be subjectively immoral 
(e.g., non-universalisable).  Hegel admits, the insistence on rationality is the 
ultimate right of the free will.  Reason is a fundamental aspect of universal 
spirit.  The question arises, how does a rational person conceive its duty when 
the universal will is not rational?  To provide an example of a non-rational 
universal will in the context of taxation, many people believe that the incidence 
of corporate taxation is borne by labor.  However, that view is not necessarily 
rational because it lacks both empirical evidence and a coherent explanatory 
theory.86  The heavy taxation of labor based solely on this belief might then be 
taken as immoral, for example, under a Libertarian framework.  Then, where 
the universal will enacts tax policies based on nonrational ideas we reach a major 
problem for democracy or any State.  This leads to the philosophical problem of 
determining what constitutes a rational (or reasoned) method toward the 
identification of the universal will.   
Another situation of where Ethical Life may become immoral is any 
situation where the universal will becomes the will toward the preservation of 
power by self-serving leadership.  For example, where the State is concerned 
with the preservation of power (as opposed to the implementation of universal 
will), then it is not clear that laws enacted by such an authority could form the 
basis for duty. The universal will is then mediated through the monarch.  If the 
monarch fails to act in accordance with the universal will, the rational person 
                                                           
84 Pulkkinen at 29. 
85 See e.g. Murray Rothbard, The Myth of Neutral Taxation, (1981) The Cato Journal. 
86 See Kimberly Clausing, In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, (2012) 65 Tax Law Review 
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might become morally obligated to preserve the potential for Ethical Life rather 
than to obey the law.  In each case, the Hegelian defense of law as the 
embodiment of societal customs mitigates in favor of the preservation of the 
status quo in the form of ostensibly immoral customs and tax laws, where the 
will to change the tax law would be opposed to custom and Hegel´s definition of 
universal spirit.87   
 
What if Excessive Tax Withholding Preempts Possession of 
Property? 
 
In the Hegelian framework, in order for the subject to develop into 
person, he must develop ‗qualities in the external sphere of [his] freedom: 
possession.‘ 88  To acquire possessions one requires money to be given in 
exchange.  For many persons the acquisition of money involves exchanging 
labor for money. Of course, the modern State is increasingly funded by wage tax 
withholding.  Thus, in some significant respect the wage laborer never comes 
into possession of the money upon which taxation is to be levied.  The system 
thereby preempts the development of freedom in the external sphere of 
possession for the wage laborer.  The same is not true of taxation levied on 
property.  The taxation of property entails the deprivation of some property to 
pay the tax, but after possession is achieved.  This difference evidences a 
potential answer to the Libertarian challenge to property taxation in that 
property taxation is justified because wage taxation prevents the laborer from 
coming into the possession of money (or, property) at all.  This preempts the 
development of Hegelian freedom in the external sphere.  Notably, the 
consequence of persons that never come into possession of money may be the 
rejection of recognition by property holding entirely.  Such a phenomenon 
seems to be developing in the United States where the younger generation 
increasingly eschews buying a home or car, since the younger generation never 
learned to identify such possessions with the exercise of freedom (i.e., 
personhood).   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Perhaps the most significant consequence of a Hegelian revival in tax 
jurisprudence relates to the underlying idea of property.  For Hegel, the 
accumulation of property from or through other persons is not the purpose of 
human life, rather property is simply one means to achieve recognition by other 
persons.89  The particular properties a subject may acquire in society (both 
physical good and other forms of individuality, such as personal traits) form the 
development of the person, but the person with the capacity to be recognized 
reciprocally by others as a subject (i.e., bearer) of rights is still something distinct 
                                                           
87  See Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §151 (‗But when individuals are simply identified with the 
actual order, ethical life (das Sittliche) appears as their general mode of conduct, i.e. as custom 
(Sitte)‘). 
88 Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, §403. 
89 Dubber, 1617 (‗In contract law and punishment, abstract right is the mutual recognition of 
equal persons.  In contract, I see the other party as an equal person and achieve mutual 
recognition and self-manifestation through an exchange of external things.‘).   
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from the property itself.90  At the minimum, Hegelian theory allows us to say 
why property (or money) accumulation is not the sole moral standard.  Moral 
right is not defined solely as even the lawful accumulation of property.  The 
Hegelian person is therefore more important than property alone because she 
has the capacity for recognition and this is evidenced in Hegel´s explanation of 
Abstract Right building to Moralität and Ethical Life.  This is also why Hegel 
says that slaves cannot bear legal rights.91  Also, the reverse situation of the 
non-recognition of the status of an otherwise wealthy person is possible (see e.g., 
Leona Helmsley92This is possible in Hegelian terms because persons are free to 
recognize other persons for any reason whatsoever, not just money holdings. 
Taxation is thus not by definition opposed to human flourishing even if it 
is presumed to diminish property accumulations in the aggregate.  The issue for 
Hegel is the recognition of the particularity of property acquired by persons as 
opposed to the quantum of money acquired.  Insofar as modern Libertarian 
ideas entail the acquisition of a certain quantum of money for interpersonal 
recognition as a person, these are non-Hegelian ideas because it changes the 
definition of a ‗person‘.  Therefore, a postmodern idea of taxation might entail 
special recognition of the subject for tax payments to the State.  As such, 
persons who pay taxes should be formally recognized by the State representing 
the celebration of the practical continuation of universal spirit via tax 
remittance.  The great patron of the State should be recognized or celebrated by 
or for universal spirit. 
the contractual transfer (or gifting) of property is in Hegelian terms an act 
of personal recognition toward another person.  Rosenfeld explains: 
 
[T]he wealthier a person happens to be, the more likely it is that she will be 
able to procure a greater number of tokens of recognition from a large 
number of individuals.  While some such tokens may be more important to 
their recipient than others, generally speaking, the relative value to a 
recipient of an individual token will decrease as the wealth of that recipient 
increases.93 
 
Rosenfeld‘s position accounts for the phenomenon why  why a wealthy person 
may be affronted to receive a gift – that is, the gift fails to recognize the aggregate 
wealth holdings of the recipient irrespective of any particularity.  Where the 
wealthy person thinks solely in quantum terms, and not in terms of particularity 
in the individual person, then it is potentially offensive to receive a gift from a 
less wealthy person notwithstanding the gift was intended as a particular token 
of recognition and not as an accretion to aggregate wealth.  
Another lesson from the Hegelian revival in tax jurisprudence relates to 
the growing underclass of persons in American society of persons with little or 
no property holdings.  These persons are at risk of not being recognized by the 
                                                           
90 Stillman, 1039 (‗Rights require a pre-exsiting relational structure of reciprocally recognizing 
persons (with free wills) – a structure that has developed historically, that represents the 
crystallization of certain habits and customs, and that (for Hegel) is characterized as 
Sittlichkeit.‘). 
91 Hegel, Philosophy of Right §155 (‗A slave can have no duties; only a free man has them.‘) 
92 Leona Helmsley was a famous real estate heiress and socialite convicted of tax fraud.  See 
Richard Hammer, The Helmsleys: The Rise and Fall of Harry & Leona (NAL Publishers 1990). 
93 Rosenfeld, 1252. 
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property holding class as legal persons at all.  As Rosenfeld pointed out persons 
that do not hold property are not recognized as equal persons.  He wrote:  
‗Such recognition is equal for everyone, for it is not the nature or quantity of 
property which accounts for the kind of recognition the latter receives, but 
merely the fact that she has property - that is, her abstract identity as a property 
owner.‘94   The development of personality cannot constitute a stage in the 
actualization of free will without embodiment in external things so wage laborers 
need some disposable income.95 
In terms of legal theory, a coherent reading of Hegel´s philosophy of law 
requires a non-static interpretation, such as that given by Pulkkinen. 96  As 
Hegel wrote, the abstract statement of positive law is entirely determinate in its 
formulation and entirely indeterminate in its application.  This is similar to 
Hegel´s distinction of morality from ethics where, ethics is the revealed 
determinacy of subjective morality; likewise, legal adjudication is the revealed 
determinacy of positive law.  This revealing of the meaning of law through 
adjudication allows for a dynamic process of evolving social customs and norms 
rendering a workable system since we know societal values change over time.  
This interpretation of Hegel is different than Pulkkinen‘s because it posits the 
function of law as to allow for change, as opposed to change as occurring in 
various stages of the Hegelian dialectic.  As a matter of legal theory, this 
approach also formally rejects the ‗law as sociology‘.97 Accordingly, ethical duty 
means acting with faith in the legal process itself and not with faith in a 
particular outcome.  The willingness to accept the outcome of the legal process 
even where it is not pleasing is ethical duty.   
In conclusion, the Hegelian revival in tax jurisprudence gets to the basic 
idea of right as the realization of freedom in the world.  Libertarians of course 
take taxation as a limitation on freedom.  The difference is that Hegelian Ethical 
Life takes right as the realization of free will in the world by the acceptance of 
ethical duty.98 So, if Libertarianism comprises a justification for the denial of 
duty in the payment of tax. This moral claim against the duty to pay tax is a 
challenge to the universal right, which is an objective question of ethics.  The 
denial of taxing authority is potentially an ethical failure, but it is not wicked.  
As Hegel wrote of Aristotle: ‗Aristotle says: ―Every wicked man is ignorant of 
what he ought to do and what he ought to refrain from doing; and it is this kind 
of failure (amartia) which makes men unjust and in general bad‖.‘99  Moral 
objections to the right of the State to levy tax are abstract claims about the 
nature of right since there is an objective duty to pay under the tax laws.  The 
rejection of any potential objectivity in the tax laws by the manufacture of 
factually indeterminate transactions is both morally (Moralität) and ethically 
(Sittlichkeit) flawed.  Finally, the quasi-Nietzschean claim that tax avoidance is 
                                                           
94 Ibid, 1231. 
95 Benson, 1167-8. 
96 See Pulkkinen, supra note 48. 
97  See Margosia Fitzmaurice, Review of Recent Books on International Law (Bilder, ed.) (2010) 
104 American Journal of International Law 329; George Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe to the 
Negotiator? Your Treaty of Our Interpretation of It, (1971),65 American Journal of 
International Law 372. 
98 Hegel, Philosophy of Right §29. 
99 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §140. 
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achieved by more capable or smarter persons on behalf of multinational firms 
formally denies the Abstract Right of other taxpayers (in addition to its moral 
and ethical failure) and this denial of legal capacity in other persons would 
potentially justify retributive punishment for tax crimes in Hegelian terms.     
